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Abstract 
We investigate the causal effect of market structure on market performance in the consumer 
electronics. We combine data from Austria’s largest online site for price comparisons with 
retail data on wholesale prices provided by a major hardware producer for consumer 
electronics. We observe input prices of firms, and all their moves in the entry and the pricing 
game over the whole product lifecycle. Using this information for 70 digital cameras, we 
generate instrumental variables for the number of firms in the market based on the shops’ 
entry decisions on other product markets in the past. We find that instrumenting is 
particularly important for estimating the effect of competition on the markup of the price 
leader. 
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1 Introduction
Analyzing the link between market structure and market performance is of central im-
portance in the field of industrial organization. In particular, antitrust and regulatory
authorities are seeking to determine the number of firms required to sustain competition
in a market. For example, the expected relation between the number of firms in the market
and market outcomes such as prices or markups is at the core of merger assessments.
Economic theory predicts that market structure affects prices. Under reasonably gen-
eral conditions, the consequence of an increase in the number of market participants is
lower prices. Experimental evidence of this relation goes back to Selten (1973), who coined
the statement, “four are few and six are many.” However, the empirical assessment of this
relation is not an easy task, as prices and market structure are endogenous: firms may enter
in response to perceived profit opportunities or may exit in response to realized losses.
Because of the difficulties in finding convincing instruments to account for endogeneity,
structural models of market structure, entry, and exit have been developed. These models
allow the estimation of unobservable economic quantities that could not be recovered using
descriptive models (Berry and Reiss (2007)). One of the pioneering studies on entry into
local markets by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) shows that the first two or three entrants
have the largest impact on market price, and that later entrants do not significantly reduce
market price any further.
In a recent survey, M. (2012) emphasizes the focus on the underlying factors that
determine market structure and performance. Market structure may adapt only slowly to
long-run equilibrium levels and many entering firms may be atypical fringe firms unable
to influence market structure at the core. While this accurately describes well-established
markets with market leaders and high advertising requirements, market structure in e-
commerce is different: because of the cheap and easy establishment of online shops, many
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such shops operate only online, without a brick-and-mortar store or physical storehouse.
Entry and exit of these firms is therefore very prevalent.
In this paper, we use an instrumental variables strategy to investigate the impact of
the number of firms on markups and price dispersion in e-commerce using data from an
Austrian online price-comparison site (price search engine) for digital cameras. Products
are only listed for a short time, which allows us to observe products over their full market
product lifecycle from birth to death. This is important for two reasons: i) entry in such
a market is particularly easy because an existing firm has to decide whether to list a new
camera or not. This makes the number of firms extremely volatile. ii) Several researchers
have claimed that competition or the absence thereof is particularly important at the
beginning of a product lifecycle,1 while later on, competition may matter less. Therefore,
as our second main focus we concentrate on the impact of the number of firms across the
full product lifecycle, which has not been shown before.
Previous studies in e-commerce, such as Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), Baye et al.
(2009), Baye et al. (2003), and Haynes and Thompson (2008b), do not take the endogeneity
of the number of sellers into account.2 Baye et al. (2003) and Baye et al. (2004) look at price
dispersion using various metrics. Haynes and Thompson (2008b) use data on 400 digital
cameras in the US and favor the model of Carlson and McAfee (1983): with more firms
in the market prices go down and dispersion increases. Haynes and Thompson (2008a)
take a first step to explain entry and exit behavior in a shopbot. To do so, they estimate
an error-correction model and show that entry into and exit from a market are correlated
with a measure of lagged price-cost margins and the number of competitors. Ellison and
1Examples include Berry (1992), Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005), Carlton (1983), Davis (2006),
Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988), Geroski (1989), Mazzeo (2002), Seim (2006), and Toivanen and
Waterson (2000, 2005).
2Barron et al. (2004), using data from gasoline retail markets, discuss the predictions of four different
models that analyze the relationship of markups and price dispersion and the number of firms. They find
that both markups and price dispersion decrease as the number of firms increases and interpret this as
evidence in favor of models of monopolistic competition.
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Ellison (2005) and Ellison and Ellison (2009) examine the competition of Internet retailers
and identify different Internet-specific firm strategies that are applied in online markets to
cope with the increased price sensitivity.
There is hardly any literature investigating the market structure along the life cycle of
a consumer product. Barron et al. (2004) mention the lifecycle, but use it only as a control
variable. In the marketing literature, Moe and Yang (2009) analyze the product lifecycle
in e-tailing. However, their data did not allow them to consider the endogeneity of entry
and exit.
For e-commerce in Austria, we find a highly significant and strong effect of the number
of firms on markups. Ten additional competitors in the market reduce median markups
by 0.22 percentage points and the minimum markup by 0.57 percentage points. However,
accounting for the potential endogeneity of markups and the number of firms in the market,
we see a substantially higher negative effect: ten additional retailers reduce the markup
of the median firm by 0.85 percentage points and the markup of the cheapest firm by
1.72 percentage points. We also find that having one more firm in the market reduces the
markup of the price leader by the same amount as the competition between existing firms
in a period of three additional weeks in the product lifecycle.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the theoretical predic-
tions derived in the literature in Section 2 and describe the data as well as the empirical
strategy in Section 3. We discuss our estimation results in Section 4 and conclude in
Section 5.
2 Theoretical Predictions
Baye and Morgan (2001) theoretically investigate the market for information gatekeepers.
They analyze the behavior of firms listed on a price-comparison site as well as the behavior
3
of the monopolistic shopbot. Shops, which have a local monopoly in their town, have to
choose between serving only the uninformed population of their own town or advertising
on the price-comparison site to potentially serve informed customers in all other towns as
well. Consumers, on the other hand, have the option to subscribe to the price-information
site or to remain uninformed. In the first case, they can choose from among all shops, but
in the latter they can only buy locally.
Given the site’s behavior and the share of consumers using the site, the model predicts
that the shops will randomize over prices in the price setting equilibrium. They do so
in order to maintain positive markups without being undercut by their opponents with
certainty. Thus, they generate price dispersion in the market for this homogenous product.
The impact of more competition on the platform is not explicitly analyzed in the model.
Yet it is relatively easy to see that the minimum price (the lower bound of the support
of the price distribution in their model) is decreasing in the number of firms, whereas the
range of the distribution (price dispersion) increases with an increasing number of firms.
As earlier studies have argued, models allowing for price dispersion in a homogenous
market have been classified into three groups:3 i) First, search-theoretic models (Varian
(1980), Rosenthal (1980)), which evoke price dispersion by introducing heterogeneity in
the search costs of consumers. Baye and Morgan (2001) is an example that directly con-
siders e-commerce. ii) Models of monopolistic competition (Perloff and Salop, 1985) can
account for price dispersion when extended by introducing asymmetries across firms, such
as heterogeneous producer cost or heterogeneous producer demand (Barron et al., 2004).
iii) Carlson and McAfee (1983) present a search-theoretic model that accommodates two
sources of heterogeneity by assuming a non-degenerate distribution of producers’ marginal
cost and heterogeneous visiting cost of consumers. Finally, a simple structure-conduct-
performance model (Bain, 1951) must also be considered.
3See, for example, Barron et al. (2004) or Haynes and Thompson (2008b).
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The first group of search-theoretic models (Varian, 1980) predicts that an increased
number of sellers results in a larger price dispersion and – somewhat counter-intuitively
– a higher average price. The second group of models with differentiated sellers and
production cost or buyer cost asymmetries would predict that a larger number of sellers
is associated with a lower average price and smaller price dispersion. Thirdly, the model
by Carlson and McAfee (1983) predicts that average prices would go down while price
dispersion is expected to rise. According to a structure-conduct-performance model where
the incumbents face the threat of entry, prices should decrease or stay the same when more
firms enter the market, depending on the strength of the entry threat. The model does
not make any predictions about price dispersion.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
Price search engine: In our analysis we use data from the largest Austrian price comparison
site, www.geizhals.at. At the time of our analysis Geizhals.at listed on average price
offers from 1,200 firms for 200,000 products. Recently, Geizhals has expanded to other
European countries, including Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom.4 This recent
internationalization leads to a substantial expansion of products and supplying retailers.
At present, the website offers more than 723,000 products with 64 million price quotes that
can could be actualized by the retailers several times per day. In January 2012, Geizhals
registered 3.1 million “unique clients.”5
The business model of Geizhals is as follows: the retailers have to pay a fixed fee for
each referral request of a customer to the respective e-shop.6 If the retailer agrees to
4See Geizhals.de, Skinflint.co.uk, Cenowarka.pl.
5The number of unique clients is calculated from the number of different terminal devices (PCs, PDAs,
etc.) used to access a website (in our case, the Geizhals websites). A unique client can be used by more
than one person. An individual can have access to more than one unique client.
6A referral request is a click by the customer on the link of an online shop at Geizhals.at. After the
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embed the Geizhals logo and link on its website, a reduced fee is paid. If the total of
these click-dependent fees does not exceed a certain limit, the online store has to pay a
flat fee. The electronic retailers can list as many products they want and can change the
prices as often they want, free of charge. There is also no cost if retailers decide to suspend
a certain price quote temporarily. Hence, apart from a relatively small flat rate and the
click-dependent fee retailers are not confronted with entry or exit costs in the different
product markets.7 By this construction, Geizhals has the incentive to increase its profits
by permanently extending the number of retailers. However, at least in Austria, Geizhals
has already acquired such a strong reputation among customers that online stores cannot
afford not to be listed at geizhals.at as the market is dominated by this price search engine.
Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that our data for Geizhals.at will cover the whole
electronic retailing market.
Available data: For the study in this paper, we use daily data on 70 items (mainly digital
cameras) from a major hardware manufacturer,8 which were listed during the period from
January 2007 through December 2008.9 We define a camera’s birth by its appearance on
Geizhals.at. The cameras were offered by up to 212 sellers from Austria and Germany.
For time t (measured in days), we observe for each product i and retailer j the priceijt,
the shipping costijt posted at the website,10 and the availabilityijt of the product.11 Addi-
tionally, we observe the customers’ referral requests (clicksijt) from the Geizhals.at website
click, the online shop of the retailer opens in a new browser window.
7Of the 1,200 retailers at the time of our analysis, only a very small number of retailers have other
contracts with Geizhals.at, e.g., they pay only for products actually sold.
8The hardware manufacturer is a multinational corporation specializing in manufacturing electronic
equipment in several areas. The manufacturer asked to keep its name anonymous.
9For our instrumentation strategy, we use also the product lifecycle of cameras entering the market
starting from May 2006.
10Shipping cost is the only variable that has to be parsed from a text field. We use the information
on “cash in advance for shipping to Germany,” which is the type of shipping cost most widely quoted by
the shops. Missing shipping costs are imputed with the mean shipping cost by the other retailers and
controlled for with a dummy for imputed values.
11If the product is available immediately or at short notice, the dummy is 1; if the product is available
within 2-4 days, it is 0.
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to the retailers’ e-commerce website as a proxy for consumer demand.12 Customers have
the option to evaluate the (service) quality of the firms on a five-point scale, the average
of which is listed together with the price information on Geizhals.at. Wholesale prices for
each product i at time t were obtained from the Austrian representative of the interna-
tional manufacturer. We do not claim that these wholesale prices correspond perfectly to
the retailers’ marginal cost. Even though the manufacturer’s distribution policy indicates
that the retailers should be served by the local representative, it may happen that single
retailers procure commodities from, for instance, the Asian market. Moreover, the local
representative might offer special promotions including lower wholesale prices in excep-
tional cases, e.g. if a retailer commits to promoting the manufacturer’s good in a special
way. Finally, it must be mentioned that the retailers in e-commerce might have additional
costs each time they order in addition to the wholesale price. Despite these qualifications,
we still believe that our measures are a very good proxy for the actual marginal cost of
the retailers.13 Priceijt and wholesale priceit were used to calculate the firms’ markupijt
according to the Lerner index and the markets’ price dispersionit.
Organization of data: We reorganized the data in such a way that the product lifecycles
of all digicams start at the same day 1. Hence, we have shifted the product lifecycles of
the digicams so that we can analyze the impact of market structure on markup and price
dispersion in a cross section of 70 product lifecycles. This reorganization of data is also im-
portant to guarantee that observations are iid. The independence assumption is especially
crucial, as the listing decisions of e-commerce traders are strategic variables: if we studied
product cycles in real time the decision to list digicam X might be related to the listing
decision of the follower model Y. By shifting the product lifecycles to identical starting
12See Dulleck et al. (2011) for a description of the data.
13According to the Austrian distributor the Austrian and German lists of wholesale prices are almost
identical. Note the manufacturer’s incentive to keep cross-border sales between distributors and retailers
as low as possible - an argument which supports the reliability of our wholesale prices as indicator for
marginal cost.
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points the iid assumption concerning our data structure is valid. We define the end of a
product life cycle as the point when the number of referral requests diminishes to less than
500 clicks. Thus, we use a daily unbalanced panel with information on the products’ age,
the number of firms, average markups, the markup of the price leader, different measures
for price-dispersion, and the number of clicks.
Descriptives: Table 1 contains summary statistics of the data. Each observation in the
descriptives refer to a single product i at a given day t in the product lifecycle. We will use
the markup (Lerner index) and the price dispersion as endogenous variables. Whereas the
median markup amounts to 17.8% on average, the mean markup for price leaders is only
4.6%. These numbers are of comparable size to those in Ellison and Snyder (2011), who
report an average markup of 4% for memory modules on Pricewatch.com. We use different
measures for price dispersion: the coefficient of variation and the standard deviation of the
distribution of prices, as well as the absolute price gap between the price leader and the
second cheapest price. On average, a product lifecycle amounts to 167 days with a mean
of 104 firms offering the digicams.
Figure 2 shows that the estimated markup declines with age, and, more importantly,
as the number of firms increases. The decline in markups with the number of firms is a
rather smooth phenomenon, and not as quick as one might expect in perfectly transparent
e-commerce markets. Even with 70 and more firms in the market, there is a positive
markup. In the top left panel, the median markupit is scattered against the number of
firmsit in the corresponding market; the top right panel shows the average pattern. The
number of firms ranges from 0 to more than 200 and the median markup ranges from 0 to
35%.
There are also some negative markups, especially for the minimum price firms, where
the average markup of the price leader is only 4.8%. In our dataset, we observe negative
markups for 26.9% of all best-price offers. This is in line with Ellison and Snyder (2011),
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who also report a substantial number of price offers with negative markups in the case
of Pricewatch.com. Negative markups might have several possible causes: they might
simply point to sellouts after overstocking, they might hint to cases where retailers are
not procuring products via official retail channels, or they might indicate the use of loss
leader strategies where a digicam is offered at a price below marginal cost to attract new
customers or to make profits with complementary goods.
In the middle row, the median markup is plotted against the age of the product. We
typically observe a camera between seven and 15 months. Again, the markets’ median
markups fall with the duration of the product lifecycle. In the lower row, the number or
retailers is plotted against the age of the camera: there is a steep increase in the number of
listing firms at the very beginning of the lifecycle, whereas after 12 months the number of
firms is declining again. This average pattern hides some heterogeneity, which can be seen
on the left-hand side. Some cameras are listed only by a minority of firms, say 20 or 60,
and do not stay on the market very long. The third group of cameras is listed by roughly
150 shops and stays on the market much longer.
Empirical strategy: To estimate the impact of market structure on markups and price
dispersion, we estimate the following fixed-effects regression as our baseline model:
markup = αj + α1 ∗ age+ α2 ∗ age2 + β1 ∗ numfirms+ β2 ∗ (numfirms)2 + jt
This model will be estimated for the median and the minimum markup; a similar strat-
egy is used for price dispersion which is measured as the coefficient of variation and other
measures. Lifecycle effects are captured by a quadratic age trend. In a later specification,
we use interactions between the age terms and the number of firms to capture varying
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competition effects over the lifecycle of the product.14
Sources of endogeneity: In all markets, particularly in particular in an e-tailing shopbot
market, it is important to treat market structure as endogenous: because of simple and
low-cost market entry and exit, e-tailers can easily adapt to changing circumstances by
listing a particular product. If, for example, some unobserved factor temporarily drives
up markups for some item, shops that did not sell the item before might move into this
market. Thus, we would expect to observe more shops in markets where higher markups
can be reaped and vice versa: reverse causation. This, in turn, will result in an upward
bias: an estimated OLS coefficient showing the correlation of the number of firms with
markups will be less negative than the true causal parameter.
On the other hand, an OLS estimate might suffer from omitted variables bias: variables
related to demand, like consumer preferences or actual sales are unobserved, but might be
correlated with both prices and market structure. Again, a positive correlation between
demand and market structure and simultaneous positive correlation between sales and
prices will lead to an upward bias of an OLS estimate. In order to overcome both problems,
we suggest an instrumentation strategy. We need an instrument that can explain market
structure but which is both unrelated with demand and has no direct influence on prices.
Moreover, there might be some heterogeneity of the cameras in the market in terms
of aspects as quality and design features that might be correlated with both markups
and entry of firms. In our estimation, we will use product fixed effects to capture these
unobserved features of the specific cameras.
Instrumentation strategy: In the Geizhals.at data, we observe the complete lifecycle
of many products from the same producer: these products were launched at different
points in time. We consider both of these facts. For markets with brand names, part of
the listing decisions can be explained by common patterns, such as an established supply
14In all the regressions we included monthly dummies to account for seasonality effects.
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relationship, that a shop might have with a producer or a wholesale importer, or variations
in the availability of the product. These patterns will remain the same over time, and they
are not influenced by contemporary changes in the market for a specific camera. Thus
we use the timing of previous listing decisions of e-tailers for other brand products of
our manufacturer as an instrument for current listing decisions. Note that the necessary
exclusion restriction will hold for our instrument: the listing decision of a series of different
products in the past will have no direct impact on markups for another product in the
future.
The instrumentation strategy is illustrated with an example in Figure 1. It represents
an e-tailer, which we shall call an E-shop for the sake of illustration. The figure illustrates
its listing decisions over time for various products: let us consider whether our E-shop
will list a product D on the third day after introduction. This decision is represented by
the encircled line on item D. We predict the probability of this event by the E-shop’s
general probability of listing a similar item that has been on the market for three days.
Considering only the items listed before product D was introduced, we use the last three
items that were introduced in the market as a whole. We then calculate how many of
those items were listed by the E-shop on the third day after they appeared. Taking the
share gives us an estimate of E-shop’s probability of listing product D on its third day of
existence. Finally, we aggregate these probabilities across shops to obtain the predictor of
the number of shops that will offer item D on a given day.
This strategy can easily be extended for each day in the product lifecycle, giving us
a predicted market structure for each day of the product cycle. For the E-shop’s listing
decision of product F on the tenth day, for example, we use the respective decisions on
the tenth day for products E, G, and H. To guarantee the validity of the instrument, we
use only products that were introduced before the introduction of the camera in question.
Note that for instrumenting F , we ignored products A through D because those cameras
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lay too far in the past. When calculating the instrument, we fixed the number of cam-
eras considered to calculate the instrument to a constant number of three products.15 In
contrast to a constant time interval our approach of fixing a constant number of products
guarantees valid standard errors that can be calculated without bootstrapping methods.
First-stage regressions: As we use the time patterns of previous listing decisions in
completely different markets, our instrument should not have a direct causal implication
for today’s markups and price dispersion. Moreover, the listing of a particular type of
camera on a particular day in the past should have no influence on sales today. Therefore,
the instrument will comply with the necessary exclusion restrictions. Table 2 presents
the first stage regressions and shows that the instrument is strong enough to explain the
market’s actual entry decisions, which are depicted by the number of firms at each point
in the product lifecycle. Columns (1) and (2) compare the contribution of the instrument
to explaining the number of firms, and columns (3) and (4) show the contribution to its
quadratic term. The instruments are strongly significant and have the expected sign. The
marginal R2 amounts to 0.011 up to 0.037 for the linear case with F-values well above 400.
The results for the quadratic terms are similar.
4 Results
4.1 Market Structure and Market Performance
Tables 3 and 4 show our basic results for the impact of market structure on markups.
These baseline specifications are parsimonious, as they consider only the number of firms
on the market – either linearly or in quadratic terms – and the product lifecycle. Moreover,
to account for seasonal effects, we add an indicator variable for offers that were quoted in
15Results using the last five products as an instrument are available on request; they are very similar.
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December.16 All product-specific influences are covered by a product fixed effect. Columns
1 and 3 show OLS estimations, whereas in Columns 2 and 4, our instrumental variables
approach is used.
Our results indicate a highly significant and relatively strong effect of the number of
firms on markups. Not accounting for the endogeneity of the number of firms and using
OLS, we would estimate the effect of ten additional competitors in the market to reduce
minimum markup by 0.57 percentage points and median markups by 0.22. The cheapest
firm reacts significantly more strongly than the median firm, which might be explained by
the high frequency with which prices are changed in online markets, where the cheapest
price is a focus of considerable attention from both consumers and firms.
If we instrument for the number of firms, we see a substantially larger negative effect:
10 additional retailers reduce the markup of the cheapest firm by 1.72 percentage points
and the markup of the median firm by 0.85 percentage points. These figures are large in
economic terms considering the standard deviation of 57 firms in our sample. As discussed
above, OLS is likely to overestimate the true effect of an additional firm on the markup,
as it does not account for the fact that attractive items also attract more firms. Again,
the cheapest firm reacts considerably more strongly than the median firm.
In Columns 3 and 4 we use a quadratic specification of the number of firms: it turns
out that there is a solid negative but decreasing influence of the number of retailers on
markup, both for the cheapest and the median firm. There is no turnaround. For the
cheapest price, the negative influence of the number of firms ceases at 560, and that for the
median markup with 340 firms given a maximum number of firms in our sample of 203.
Looking at the impact of the product cycle on markups, we get very interesting results:
in all 2SLS regressions, markups grow in the beginning and go down after the first few
months until the end of the product lifecycle. For the minimum markup, the turning point
16The results for this variable are omitted in the tables to follow.
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is between five and six months (Columns 2 and 4 of Tables 3 and 4), which is around the
mean duration of a product lifecycle of 5.5 months. For the median markup, the turning
point is at eight to nine months, and is slightly above the mean duration of the product
lifecycle. It seems that markups tend to grow as the market grows, but decline later on,
perhaps as a consequence of saturation in the market.
To investigate the impact of the number of sellers on price dispersion we concentrate on
the coefficient of variation (Table 5). While the OLS regressions show a somewhat negative
relation between the number of firms and price dispersion, in the 2SLS results (Columns 2
and 4), we see a strong positive relationship. In the linear case, increasing the number of
firms by 10 increases the coefficient of variation by 0.03. For the quadratic case (Column
4) we observe increasing price dispersion up to the value of 106 firms. Note that the mean
of supplying firms per product is 104. For a higher number of firms, the coefficient of
variation shrinks again.
The combined results on markups and price dispersion are compatible with the model
of Carlson and McAfee (1983), i.e. a search theoretic model that accommodates two
sources of heterogeneities by assuming a non-degenerate distribution of producers’ marginal
cost and heterogeneous visiting costs of consumers. In addition, the augmented search
theoretic model by Baye and Morgan (2001), which features randomization over prices as
a consequence of zero online search costs, are well in line with our findings. The other
search theoretic models are, however, not in line with our findings of a decreasing median
markup. Models of monopolistic competition, on the other hand, predict a decreasing price
dispersion. With the exception of the quadratic case for more than 106 firms we find no
empirical evidence for this type of model.
The clear purpose of the price comparison site is to facilitate price comparisons and,
thus, to increase price competition. This is what we find in our results for markups: there
is a strong markup-reducing effect of an increasing number of firms. Consumers have to
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pay shipping costs in addition to this net price. While sellers are ranked at Geizhals.at
according to net prices, prospective shipping costs are reported on the website as well. A
quick and easy comparison thereof is not possible, though, because there is no automatic
ranking and there are typically several ways to report shipping costs on the website, e.g.
standard shipping, shipping to Germany or Austria, and different shipping costs depending
on the payment options. Given the fact that shipping costs are often used as an obfuscation
strategy in such markets (Ellison and Ellison, 2009) and that these shipping costs are far
more difficult to compare across firms, it is interesting to see whether shipping costs react
to market pressure as well.
In Table 6, we report the effects of the market structure on shipping costs divided
by median price to make it comparable. As there are different shipping costs possible,
we concentrate on those mostly observed in the data: shipping costs to Germany when
paying cash in advance. Interestingly, the patterns are largely the same as in Tables 3
and 4. While OLS predicts a positive relationship between shipping costs and the number
of firms, Columns 2 and 4 reveal a robust negative relationship with a small and positive
quadratic term.
It is remarkable that more competition decreases shipping costs. This market structure
effect of shipping costs is economically significant, but only around one-third of the effect
the number of firms has on median markups and one-sixth of the effect on minimum
markups. These results confirm the visibility argument, that consumers have a much
harder time comparing shipping costs than actual prices. A simple shipping cost equation
not shown in the text where we estimate shipping costs in cents, shows that ten more firms
actually decrease the average shipping cost in that market by seven cents, a relatively large
number given the standard deviation of 57 firms.
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4.2 Lifecycle Effects
In this section we investigate whether the profit-squeezing effect of a higher number of
firms is the same in different phases of the product lifecycle. Several authors claim that
competition might be particularly important at the beginning of the lifecycle of a product
(e.g. Toivanen and Waterson (2005) and Berry (1992)); on the other hand, it could be
that at the beginning of the product lifecycle pioneer consumers react less to prices and
therefore a higher markup can be achieved.
To do this, we extend the model to check for different effects of market structure on
markups over the product cycle. In Table 7, we expand our baseline model and add
crossterms, interacting the number of firms with age (both linearly and quadratically).
For ease of interpretation of the coefficients, in Figures 3 and 4 we plot these results for
the minimum and median markup, respectively.
In these plots, each line represents a product of a certain age; we plot the curve for
products right after their introduction and after 1, 2, 3, 6, and 9 months on the market.
To clarify, for each phase of the lifecycle we concentrate on the typical situation concerning
the number of firms.17 Our plots show a consistent pattern, which appears to consist of
three phases. In Figure 3, we observe the pattern for minimum markups. Apart from
the months in the middle, we see a clear pattern: markups decline with more firms. This
pattern, however, is less pronounced during months 2-4, where we observe a movement to
the right, with more firms entering while markups remain stable, indicating only a small
negative effect. Toward the end of the cycle (month 6 and later), competitive pressures
again become more pronounced and the relationship becomes negative again.
Comparing the six curves, we can consider the development of markups over time. The
17We plot only in the region between the 33rd and 67th percentile of the distribution concerning firm
sizes to avoid extrapolation of the polynomials. The dots represent the median of the empirically observed
distribution of the number of firms.
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median markup for each phase is indicated by a dot: at first, markups fall drastically, but
then they stabilize and even recover slightly. Figure 3 shows the minimum markup which
decreases below 0 within 2 months. However, after that, it remains close to 0 with more
or less fierce competition, depending on the phase of the lifecycle.
For the case of median markups in Figure 4, we observe a fairly similar pattern: more
firms in the market means lower median markup, particularly in the beginning and toward
the end of the lifecycle, with a flatter curve in the middle. Again, there is an initial
reduction of markups over the time of the lifecycle, but this trend turns around after three
months and then median markups even rise slightly again.
4.3 Robustness
We perform several robustness checks. First, we test the robustness of the basic results by
using varying definitions of price dispersion and by using other definitions of markups, i.e.
by including shipping costs in sales prices. Moreover, at the end, we take account of the
fact that some of the price offers may attract less attention from potential buyers; we use
click-weighted markups to control for this.
Our first robustness check, shown in Table 8, concerns our definition of price disper-
sion. We experiment with different definitions: apart from the coefficient of variation (the
benchmark case from Table 5, Column 4) we use the standard deviation of prices and a co-
efficient of variation calculated in such a way that the prices are weighted with the number
of clicks received. All these variations show a similar pattern: price dispersion increases
with the number of firms at a decreasing rate; in all cases, the turning point is larger
than the average number of firms in the sample. Interestingly, applying the click-weighting
increases the turning point even further, to 175 firms.
The next robustness check, shown in Table 9, concerns the measurement of prices.
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Consumers typically pay the product price plus shipping costs. In such a case, the total
price including shipping costs should be used to calculate the markup of the firm. Again, we
use shipping costs to Germany when paying cash in advance. Consistent with our previous
results on shipping costs, our comprehensive markup model in Table 9 shows even a higher
causal effect of market structure on markups: both the minimum and median markups
decline significantly with the number of firms, and price dispersion is increasing.
We investigate further whether our results are influenced by the fact that we treat
all product offers symmetrically in our regressions. In particular, in questions of price
dispersion researchers typically mistrust the validity of price offers that are much too high
(cf. Baye et al. (2004)). This suggests weighing price offers with the number of clicks they
receive to give low-ranked and perhapse less reliable price offers less weight. When we do
this in Table 10, our main results are reinforced.
Finally, we want to see whether our results are due to changes in the composition of
the shops offering an item over the lifecycle. In particular, the presence of larger shops,
cheaper, or more reliable shops or a higher presence of shops that sell not only online but
also have a brick and mortar outlet might affect the outcomes. Therefore, in Tables 11 and
12, we include the composition of shops in the regression. In these tables, Column 1 shows
the quadratic 2SLS estimation from Tables 3 and 4. We then add the share of firms that
have the item stocked (i.e., immediately available), the share of firms with low reputation,
the share of low-price firms, the share of large firms, and the share of shops with a brick
and mortar facility. All of these shares are scaled on a range from 0 to 100: for example,
if, in Table 11, the share of large firms increases by 10%, this is associated with a drop in
median markups by 0.62 percentage points.
When we introduce these measures of market heterogeneity one by one, because they
are to a large extent multicollinear, we find our general results completely unaffected. Both,
minimum and median markups fall as the share of larger firms (Column 5) and the share
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of firms with low reputation (Column 3) increase. The sign of the statistically significant
variables are reasonable: we would expect lower markups for firms with low reputation and
stronger competition in case of an increasing share of large firms in which undercutting of
prices might have a larger impact. The decrease of markups is more pronounced for the size
of the firms. The pattern is somewhat ambiguous for the share of low-price firms (Column
4). The presence of generally low-price shops in a market decreases the median markup,
but has a positive effect on minimum markups. It seems that these generic low-price shops
themselves have lower markups, decreasing the median, but they might be too small to
influence the minimum price in the market downward. Finally, the share of firms that have
the item in stock (Column 2) and the share of firms also having a brick-and-mortar facility
(Column 6) are related to an increase in markups; again, the positive signs confirm the
expected price-setting behavior.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we estimate the effect of market structure on market performance in e-
commerce. As endogeneity of market structure and market performance is an important
issue, particularly in e-commerce, we correct for this problem using an instrumental vari-
able strategy based on regularities in listing behavior over past product lifecycles. We use
data for 70 different digital cameras and find that an increase in the number of sellers in
a market by 10 reduces the markup of the price leader by 1.72 percentage points and that
of the median firm by 0.85 percentage points. Comparisons with simple OLS estimations
show that instrumenting is, in fact, very important; the markup-reducing effects of com-
petition would be estimated to be much lower. Moreover, we find a positive effect of the
number of firms on the coefficient of variation of prices. This combined pattern in terms of
markups and price dispersion is compatible with a search-theoretic model combining both
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heterogeneities in producers’ marginal costs as well as the search costs of consumers.
Our results are also in line with the predictions of Baye and Morgan (2001) and the
results of recent empirical papers by Haynes and Thompson (2008b) for the US online
market for cameras and with Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) for the US brick-and-mortar
retail industry. In both cases, the competitive effects of an increasing number of firms
persist in a homogenous goods market. Even with more than one hundred retailers we find
that markups still decrease.
When we differentiate market structure effects over the full lifecycle of a product, we
find a negative impact throughout, which is especially pronounced in the beginning and the
late phases of the lifecycle. Our results refer to e-tailing in the presence of a price-search
engine with very narrowly defined products. In such a situation, consumers can very easily
collect information about prices and seller reliability. Still, it takes a large number of sellers
and a relatively long time for firm markups to dissipate.
The markup of the price leader also diminishes over the lifecycle of the product. This
allows us to compare the competitive effect of the number of firms to the effect of time:
having one more firm in the market reduces the markup of the price leader by the same
amount as three additional weeks in the product lifecycle. In other words, by waiting three
more weeks a consumer will get the same price reduction she would get if she went to a
market with one additional firm, ceteris paribus. In reality, waiting longer will typically
also increase the number of firms, thus increasing the advantage of waiting. Our results
highlight the usefulness of considering this very specific market for consumer electronics,
where product lifecycles are particularly short and thus can be fully observed. Thus,
analyses of such environments have great potential to shed light on phenomena of markups
over the product lifecycle, early adopters, and inter-temporal price discrimination.
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Table 3: Minimum markup
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
# of firms/10 -0.5729*** -1.7157*** -0.9611*** -1.7876***
(0.012) (0.109) (0.030) (0.132)
(# of firms/10)2 0.0219*** 0.0160**
(0.002) (0.008)
age (months) -1.2275*** 1.3248*** -1.2477*** 0.8375***
(0.044) (0.247) (0.044) (0.138)
age2 0.0323*** -0.1193*** 0.0355*** -0.0889***
(0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.009)
constant 16.1911*** 20.6920*** 17.0929*** 20.5172***
(0.108) (0.446) (0.126) (0.352)
R2 0.495 0.501
observations 15,893 15,893 15,893 15,893
products included 70 70 70 70
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; dependent variable: minimum
markup. The table shows the results from the fixed-effects panel regressions. Columns 1 and 3 show the
estimates from the OLS; Columns 2 and 4 show the results for 2SLS panel regressions that use the instrumental
variable to account for the endogeneity of the number of firms.
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Table 4: Median markup
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
# of firms/10 -0.2220*** -0.8476*** -0.6656*** -0.9078***
(0.007) (0.063) (0.018) (0.075)
(# of firms/10)2 0.0251*** 0.0134***
(0.001) (0.004)
age (months) -0.1890*** 1.2080*** -0.2120*** 0.8002***
(0.026) (0.144) (0.026) (0.078)
age2 0.0065*** -0.0765*** 0.0102*** -0.0510***
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005)
constant 20.8724*** 23.3361*** 21.9029*** 23.1899***
(0.065) (0.259) (0.074) (0.199)
R2 0.145 0.182
observations 15,893 15,893 15,893 15,893
products included 70 70 70 70
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; dependent variable: median
markup. The table shows the results from the fixed-effects panel regressions. Columns 1 and 3 show the
estimates from the OLS; Columns 2 and 4 show the results for 2SLS panel regressions that use the instrumental
variable to account for the endogeneity of the number of firms.
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Table 5: Coefficient of Variation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
# of firms/10 -0.0034*** 0.0303*** -0.0030** 0.0445***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
(# of firms/10)2 -0.0000 -0.0021***
(0.000) (0.000)
age (months) -0.0022 -0.0780*** -0.0022 -0.0238***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005)
age2 0.0001 0.0046*** 0.0001 0.0012***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
constant 0.1292*** -0.0034 0.1282*** -0.0032
(0.004) (0.015) (0.005) (0.014)
R2 0.008 0.008
observations 15,801 15,801 15,801 15,801
products included 70 70 70 70
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; Dependent variable: Coefficient
of Variation. The table shows the results from the fixed-effects panel regressions. Columns 1 and 3 show the
estimates from the OLS; Columns 2 and 4 show the results for 2SLS panel regressions that use the instrumental
variable to account for the endogeneity of the number of firms.
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Table 6: Shipping Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
# of firms/10 0.0127*** -0.2693*** -0.0934*** -0.3834***
(0.002) (0.022) (0.004) (0.020)
(# of firms/10)2 0.0058*** 0.0192***
(0.000) (0.001)
age (months) 0.0895*** 0.6593*** 0.0797*** 0.1436***
(0.006) (0.046) (0.005) (0.018)
age2 -0.0036*** -0.0373*** -0.0024*** -0.0048***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
constant 1.9692*** 3.2970*** 2.2672*** 3.1628***
(0.015) (0.108) (0.018) (0.065)
R2 0.102 0.145
observations 15,441 15,441 15,441 15,441
products included 70 70 70 70
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; dependent variable: shipping
cost (as a share of the median price in the market). The table shows the results from the fixed-effects panel
regressions. Columns 1 and 3 show the estimates from the OLS; Columns 2 and 4 show the results for 2SLS
panel regressions that use the instrumental variable to account for the endogeneity of the number of firms.
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Table 9: Markup and price dispersion including shipping costs
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES min markup med markup coeff. of variation
# of firms/10 -2.3518*** -1.4160*** 0.0554***
(0.143) (0.111) (0.006)
(# of firms/10)2 0.0407*** 0.0280*** -0.0020***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.000)
age (months) 0.9331*** 1.3266*** -0.0413***
(0.150) (0.116) (0.005)
age2 -0.0827*** -0.0825*** 0.0023***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.000)
constant 25.4791*** 26.5884*** -0.0865***
(0.474) (0.366) (0.024)
observations 15,511 15,511 15,186
products included 70 70 70
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; the table shows the estimation results
when computing markups and price dispersion based on gross prices (total of price + shipping cost). For computing
gross prices we used the cost of shipping to Germany that was charged for cash-in-advance payments.
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Figure 1: Instrument using firm’s listing behavior in earlier lifecycles
Notes: If we want to predict how many shops will list a product on any given day q after introduction we use a shop’s
general probability of listing one of the three items that entered the market before product j, q days after they were
introduced. Examples: to predict listing behavior for camera D on day 3 (encircled dash), we would use information
on the three cameras A, B, and C on their respective third days of existence (black squares). However, we would not
use the information from the Cameras that saw light after D was introduced. To predict how many shops listed camera
F on day 10 (encircled dash), we would use the information from the three cameras E, G, H which saw light before
F was introduced. Cameras A, B, C (on day 10) are ignored for the computations of the instrument for camera F on
day 10. These considerations can be applied to each day in the product lifecycle of a camera.
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Figure 2: Median markup plotted against the number of firms and age of product
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Notes: The plot shows the empirically observed distributions of the number of firms, age and median markup
plotted against each other. In the top left panel, the median markupit is scattered against the number of
firmsit in the corresponding market and the right column shows the corresponding averages. In the middle
row the median markup is plotted against the age of the product. In the lower row, the number of firms is
plotted against the age of the cameras (in months).
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Figure 3: Minimum markup in different phases of the product lifecycle
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
m
a
rk
up
0 50 100 150
number of firms
Beginning month_1
month_2 month_3
month_6 month_9
Notes: The plot shows the curve estimated in Table 7. Each curve shows the estimated relationship of
the number of firms and the markup at a different point in time (right after introduction and after 1, 2,
3, 6, and 9 months). The curves are plotted on the range from the 33rd to 67th percentile, and the dots
represent the median of the empirically observed distribution of the number of firms at the point in time to
which it corresponds.
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Figure 4: Median markup in different phases of the product lifecycle
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Notes: The plot shows the curve estimated in Table 7. Each curve shows the estimated relationship of
the number of firms and the markup at a different point in time (right after introduction and after 1, 2,
3, 6 and 9 months). The curves are plotted on the range from the 33rd to 67th percentile, and the dots
represent the median of the empirically observed distribution of the number of firms at the point in time to
which it corresponds.
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